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Efficient Deterrence of Workplace Sexual 
Harassment 
Joni Hersch† 
ABSTRACT 
Although sexual harassment imposes costs on both victims and organizations, it is 
also costly for organizations to reduce sexual harassment. Legislation, education, 
training, and litigation have all been unsuccessful in eradicating workplace sexual 
harassment. My proposal is to establish financial incentives of sufficient magni-
tude to incentivize organizations to eliminate sexual harassment. The key chal-
lenge is in monetizing the harm caused by sexual harassment. I propose a new 
approach that draws on my research, which calculated the risk of sexual harass-
ment by gender, industry, and age based on charges filed with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. Using these risk measures, I established that 
workers receive a hazard pay premium for exposure to risk of sexual harassment. 
This premium reflects the higher pay workers need to work in a more hostile work 
environment and monetizes the aggregate societal evaluation of exposure to risk of 
an abhorred workplace behavior. Using my estimates of the pay premium, I calcu-
late a value that I refer to as the “value of statistical harassment” (VSH). This 
amount is $7.6 million, far greater than the current federal cap of $300,000 for the 
largest firms. Raising the damages cap on awards to this level would provide or-
ganizations with the necessary financial incentive for efficient deterrence. 
INTRODUCTION 
The #MeToo movement has graphically revealed the widespread 
decades-long practices of unwelcome and often criminal sexual acts per-
petrated by men at the top of their industries. The acts described in 
mainstream media go well beyond misaimed courting overtures. The 
treatment by these harassers has been career destroying for victims. 
 
 †  Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Law and Economics, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st 
Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203. joni.hersch@vanderbilt.edu. (615) 343-7717. The author 
would like to thank participants at The University of Chicago Legal Forum Annual Symposium, 
the Legal Forum editors, Jessica Clarke, and W. Kip Viscusi for valuable feedback, and Sarah 
Dalton, Danielle Drory, and Erin Meyers for their outstanding research assistance and excellent 
suggestions and comments. 
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Meanwhile, the harassers continued to victimize subordinates with im-
punity, often with tacit assent of numerous observers and colleagues 
who were in the position to stop their behavior.1 
Although the #MeToo movement has raised awareness of sexual 
harassment2 and has been costly to some individual harassers that have 
lost jobs and suffered reputational harm, the bulk of the cost continues 
to be borne by victims. The continued prevalence of sexual harassment 
does not merely reflect the harasser’s or their organization’s failure to 
consider the consequences that may result from such behavior but ra-
ther that the expected consequences have been largely inconsequential. 
Low reporting, an even lower probability of a successful lawsuit, and a 
low federal cap on damages awards combine to create a situation in 
which organizations rarely suffer substantial financial consequences 
from tolerating workplace sexual harassment. In contrast, there are 
countervailing costs associated with monitoring workplace behavior 
and sanctioning or removing from their positions some of the most val-
ued or highly-placed employees. 
Damages awards can be used to deter risky or illegal workplace 
behavior in an efficient manner. Currently, however, damages awards 
in employment discrimination cases are not structured to provide a de-
terrence function. A fundamental problem can be traced to the federal 
cap on damages awards in employment discrimination cases, which, 
based on my analysis reported in this Article, is currently set at a level 
far short of that required for efficient deterrence.3 
To address this shortfall, I propose that there be statutory changes 
to increase the cap to a more effective level. To establish the efficient 
deterrence level for sexual harassment, I follow the same economic prin-
ciples used to establish efficient deterrence values for workplace mor-
tality risks. The deterrence values for mortality risks is based on the 
pay that workers require to face mortality risks; I correspondingly de-
rive the deterrence value for sexual harassment based on the pay that 
workers require for such hostile work environments. This value is about 
$7.6 million (in 2017 dollars) per sexual harassment claim filed with 
 
 1 Many examples have been described in the media. See, e.g., the highly detailed New York 
Times article reporting on Harvey Weinstein’s “complicity machine.” Megan Twohey et al., Wein-
stein’s Complicity Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/1 
2/05/us/harvey-weinstein-complicity.html [https://perma.cc/9AM8-9ZAH]. 
 2 A note on terminology: Sex-based harassment is a term used to describe behavior that in-
cludes sexual harassment among other forms of gender-based harassment. The legal issue in my 
empirical analysis described in Part IV is recorded as “sexual harassment” in the EEOC charge 
data. I therefore use the term “sexual harassment” throughout this Article, but note that the term 
“sex-based harassment” is commonly used to characterize the broader workplace issues associated 
with workplace harassment. See Jennifer L. Berdahl, Harassment Based on Sex: Protecting Social 
Status in the Context of Gender Hierarchy, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 641, 641–42 (2007). 
 3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2012). 
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the EEOC, far above the current maximum damages award under Title 
VII of $300,000 for the largest firms.4 
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I summarizes the costs of 
sexually harassing behavior to victims and to organizations. These costs 
are disproportionately borne by the victims; indeed, sanctioning sexual 
harassers can be costly to the organization. Part II summarizes survey 
evidence that demonstrates that sexual harassment is still common in 
the workplace. Part III provides an overview of possible approaches to 
deterring sexual harassment. The continuing high prevalence of sexual 
harassment confirms that current approaches provide inadequate in-
centives for deterrence. 
In light of the inadequacy of current approaches, Part IV describes 
how damages awards can serve a deterrence function by analogy to the 
approach government agencies use to set efficient deterrence amounts 
for mortality risks. The key challenge to using damages awards as a 
deterrent is monetizing the harm caused by sexual harassment. I de-
scribe my approach, which is based on recognizing sexual harassment 
as a job risk. I discuss the tradeoffs for individuals working in jobs with 
high levels of sexual harassment, provide measures of the risk of sexual 
harassment, and summarize my research that demonstrates that 
women receive a hazard pay premium for exposure to the risk of work-
place sexual harassment. This hazard pay premium serves as the basic 
building block for establishing the amount that firms should be penal-
ized for sexual harassment. In Part V, I argue that the compensation of 
victims of sexual harassment should be based on what I term the Value 
of Statistical Harassment (VSH) derived from the hazard pay premium 
and provide the calculations of this measure. The VSH is the sexual 
harassment risk counterpart to the commonly used value of a statistical 
life (VSL), which is generally used to establish optimal deterrence levels 
for morality risks. Part VI describes how the VSH can be used for effi-
cient deterrence by setting damages awards to the level of the VSH. 
Doing so will raise both the costs to organizations of tolerating work-
place sexual harassment and the benefits to victims of filing an EEOC 
claim. The greater potential benefits to victims will bolster the incentive 
to file suits, thereby raising the probability of detection for sexual har-
assers and remedying the failure of Title VII to appropriately address 
the systemic issue of sexual harassment. 
 
 4 See id. 
150 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS COSTLY TO VICTIMS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS—BUT MOSTLY COSTLY TO VICTIMS 
Organizational tolerance of sexual harassment has been identified 
as the most important influence on whether sexual harassment occurs 
in a workplace.5 It is more prevalent in traditionally male occupations 
and in organizations with large power differences within a hierarchical 
structure,6 such as the military.7 
There is extensive evidence that victims of sexual harassment suf-
fer a range of physical, psychological, and career consequences. These 
costs include lower job satisfaction, worse psychological and physical 
health, higher absenteeism, less commitment to their organizations, 
and higher quit rates.8 Workers who report sexual harassment are more 
likely to face retaliation, which is associated with even greater loss of 
job satisfaction and worse health outcomes than those arising from the 
harassment alone.9 The risk of retaliation is higher if the harasser is a 
supervisor.10 
The costs to workplaces are the flip side of the costs to victims. Sub-
stantial empirical evidence shows that workplaces in which sexual har-
assment is tolerated are subject to inefficient turnover, increasing ab-
senteeism, and generally wasted work time as workers attempt to avoid 
interaction with harassers.11 Furthermore, the threat of litigation 
 
 5 Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual Harassment in Organizations: 
A Test of an Integrated Model, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 578, 583–86 (1997); Chelsea R. Willness et al., A 
Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Consequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 127, 135–39 (2007). A list of additional risk factors is provided in CHAI R. 
FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM’N, SELECT TASK 
FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, REPORT OF CO-CHAIRS 25–30 (2016) 
[hereinafter EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 6 Remus Ilies et al., Reported Incidence Rates of Work-Related Sexual Harassment in the United 
States: Using Meta-Analysis to Explain Reported Rate Disparities, 56 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 607, 609 
(2003). 
 7 Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, The Sexual Harassment of Female Active-Duty 
Personnel: Effects on Job Satisfaction and Intentions to Remain in the Military, 61 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 55, 59 (2006). 
 8 See EUROPEAN COMM’N. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, INDUS. RELATIONS, & SOC. 
AFFAIRS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (1998); U.S. MERIT SYS. 
PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS: PROGRESS, AND 
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 24 (1995), https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?docnu 
mber=253661&version=253948&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/EX8C-JATZ] [hereinaf-
ter USMSPB REPORT]; Darius K-S. Chan et al., Examining the Job-Related, Psychological and Physical 
Outcomes of Workplace Sexual Harassment: A Meta-Analytic Review, 32 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 362, 362–
64 (2008); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 5, at 583–86; Willness et al., supra note 5, 135–39. 
 9 Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Conse-
quences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 230, 231 (2002). 
 10 Blair Druhan Bullock, Judicial and Agency Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Laws (May 
2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University) (on file at https://law.vander-
bilt.edu/phd/students/files/Bullock.pdf) [https://perma.cc/PKH9-XJUW]. 
 11 See USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8, at 23–27; Fitzgerald et al., supra note 5, at 586; Willness 
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looms, which may involve costly legal defenses as well as any payment 
to victims.12 Firms may suffer reputational harm, which may lead to 
difficulty in hiring or to lower firm profitability.13 
However, comparing the costs of sexual harassment to the overall 
monetary scale of organizations suggests that the costs to organizations 
are relatively small. The costs of workplace sexual harassment in the 
U.S. federal government over the two-year period from 1992 to 1994 
were estimated to be $327.1 million.14 This takes into account lost 
productivity due to job turnover, sick leave, individual productivity, and 
workgroup productivity, with the loss to workplace productivity ac-
counting for 61 percent of the total.15 However, compared to the federal 
budget, this cost represents rounding error, if that.16 
A 1988 report estimated the costs to a typical Fortune 500 firm 
were $6.7 million annually.17 These costs came from absenteeism, lower 
productivity, increased health care costs, poor morale, and employee 
turnover (but excluding litigation costs and damages awards).18 A dif-
ferent study reports an average sexual harassment liability loss esti-
mate of $600,000 in 1994 including legal fees.19 However, compared to 
the value of a Fortune 500 firm in 1988 dollars, such costs are minor. 
Take Ford Motor with 2017 revenues of $151.8 billion. In 1988 dollars, 
this is $75.325 billion, making the average sexual harassment liability 
loss equal to about 0.09 percent of revenues.20 Awards resulting from 
EEOC litigation similarly show that liability loss is small. For example, 
 
et al., supra note 5, at 136–37; Jana L. Raver & Michele J. Gelfand, Beyond The Individual Victim: 
Linking Sexual Harassment, Team Processes, and Team Performance, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 387, 392–
94 (2005). 
 12 See Alexis Christoforous, The Cost of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, YAHOO FIN. (Dec. 
5, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/cost-sexual-harassment-workplace-190250229.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/MGJ3-B7NK]. 
 13 Joni Hersch, Equal Employment Opportunity Law and Firm Profitability, 26 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 139, 151–53 (1991) (showing that firms involved in employment discrimination litiga-
tion suffer substantial loss in the value of these firms). Studies showing costs due to reputation 
are summarized in EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 22–23. 
 14 USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8, at 26. 
 15 Id. 
 16 In 1993 and 1994 combined, federal outlays totaled $2.87 trillion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 27 (2016). 
 17 Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN 68–73 (Dec. 
1988). 
 18 Id. at 71. 
 19 FRANCIS ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES, LANDMARK 
DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT 157 (1999). 
 20 The Top 10, FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/2017/ [https://perma.cc/G8RV-UF 
T2] (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
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the EEOC recovered $164.5 million in 2015 for workers alleging har-
assment.21 But this too is a trivial share of the economy.22 
In sum, although one might expect that profit-maximizing firms 
would have an incentive to eliminate unproductive behavior, because 
sexual harassment is costly for firms to monitor and eliminate, sexual 
harassment clearly occurs in some workplace environments. The point 
is not that sexual harassment isn’t costly to organizations—it is, and it 
is clearly costly to victims—but that it is not costly enough for adequate 
deterrence. 
II. PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Although recent media coverage may seem to suggest that sexual 
harassment is overwhelmingly common, reliable data on the prevalence 
of sexual harassment, and especially data on harassment that would 
meet the legal definition, is lacking. Because the bulk of sexual harass-
ment events goes unreported, most of our knowledge of its prevalence 
is from surveys.23 Surveys utilize different definitions of sexually har-
assing behavior and also differ widely on time periods covered (request-
ing reports of sexual harassment from as little as three months to any 
past experience with no time limit) and differ by population surveyed.24 
Most surveys do not sample from a nationally representative population 
but instead are based on specific groups (by occupation, industry, or 
within a single workplace).25 
Researchers primarily use two methods to elicit experiences of sex-
ual harassment.26 In the direct query approach, respondents are asked 
to report whether they have been sexually harassed according to their 
own definition of harassment.27 The second method is a behavioral ex-
periences approach in which respondents are asked to indicate whether 
they have experienced any of the behaviors, such as sexual teasing, 
looks, or gestures, on a provided list. Incidence rates based on a behav-
ioral experiences survey are higher than when based on direct query. A 
meta-analysis using fifty-five probability samples from the U.S. finds 
 
 21 EEOC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at v. This value includes recovery for any type of 
workplace harassment, not only harassment on the basis of sex. 
 22 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 16, at 26–28. 
 23 Joni Hersch, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, IZA WORLD OF LABOR 3–3 (Oct. 2015), 
https://wol.iza.org/articles/sexual-harassment-in-workplace/long [https://perma.cc/4SK4-99XZ]. 
 24 Hersch, supra note 23, at 2. 
 25 See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 8. 
 26 Hersch, supra note 23, at 2. 
 27 Id. at 2; see also, e.g., Joni Hersch, Valuing the Risk of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 57 
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 111, 116 n.11 (2018). For an example of a direct query question, the Gen-
eral Social Survey asks respondents: “In the last 12 months, were you sexually harassed by anyone 
while you were on the job?” 
147] EFFICIENT DETERRENCE 153 
that the incidence rate is about double when based on the behavioral 
survey than on direct query, with an incidence rate of 24 percent based 
on direct query and 58 percent based on behavioral experiences.28 
The Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ) developed by Louise 
Fitzgerald and co-authors is the survey most commonly used to record 
individual perceptions of whether they have been sexually harassed at 
work.29 The authors intended the survey to measure psychological sex-
ual harassment, although they claim that the survey parallels the def-
inition of illegal sexual harassment.30 The survey has been revised by 
Fitzgerald and colleagues over time, and various modifications have 
been used in sexual harassment surveys, but the essential form is a 
series of questions that are grouped into three categories: gender har-
assment, unwanted sexual attention, and sexual coercion.31 
An insight into the potential disconnect between survey-based evi-
dence on sexual harassment and the legal definition is provided in 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dial Corporation.32 
Challenging expert evidence, Dial claimed that the SEQ did not meas-
ure sexual harassment within the meaning of Title VII.33 The EEOC’s 
expert, Louise Fitzgerald, argued that what it measures is “sexual har-
assment under the social science definition” in the “commonly under-
stood sense of sex-related behavior that is unwanted and unrecipro-
cated by the recipient.”34 The trial judge did not consider this point 
alone to invalidate the SEQ for legal purposes.35 However, he did find 
that the SEQ did not truly measure what it purports to measure; that 
is, truly offensive sex-related experiences at work during the time frame 
alleged by the plaintiffs.36 The judge expressed further concerns over 
 
 28 Ilies et al., supra note 6, at 619–23. 
 29 See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Ac-
ademia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 157–59 (1988); Maria Rotundo et al., A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 914, 915 (2001). 
 30 See Fitzgerald, supra note 29, at 155. The relevance of the SEQ to the legal definition of 
sexual harassment has been questioned in the academic literature. See Barbara A. Gutek et al., A 
Review and Critique of the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ), 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 457, 459 
(2004). 
 31 See Gutek, supra note 30, at 461. 
 32 No. 99 C 3356, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17543 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2002). 
 33 Id. at *9. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at *9–10. 
 36 The survey requested reports of experiences during the time the respondent was employed 
by Dial and not restricted to the time period at question in litigation. The survey requested fre-
quency of experiences without any indication of whether respondents found the experiences offen-
sive or unwelcome. Id. at *12–13. 
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bias introduced by self-selection of respondents.37 Fitzgerald’s report 
was excluded from evidence.38 
Although survey evidence may not reach legal standards, most of 
our evidence on the prevalence of sexual harassment continues to be 
derived from surveys. Perhaps the most reliable trend evidence on sex-
ual harassment is derived from the U.S. Merit Systems Protection 
Board (USMSPB) survey, “Sexual Harassment in the Federal Work-
place.” This is a behavioral experiences survey of federal employees con-
ducted in 1980, 1987, 1994, and 2016.39 Among other questions, these 
surveys asked respondents to report whether they had experienced any 
of a series of the following unwanted or uninvited behaviors in the past 
two years: sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, questions; sexual looks or 
gestures; invasion of personal space by deliberate touching, leaning, 
cornering; pressure for dates; communication of a sexual nature by let-
ters, calls, or sexual materials; stalking; pressure for sexual favors; and 
actual or attempted rape or assault.40 
Table 1 provides the summary of sexually harassing behaviors re-
ported in the USMSPB surveys in 1980, 1987, 1994, and 2016.41 As Ta-
ble 1 shows, a large share of workers, both male and female, report that 
they have been sexually harassed, with women far more likely than 
men to report that they have been sexually harassed. In 1994, the sur-
vey shows that 44 percent of women and 19 percent of men had experi-
enced unwanted sexual attention on the job in the preceding two years. 
The values are fairly similar to the percent reporting unwanted sexual 
attention in the 1980 and 1987 waves of the survey. Encouragingly, by 
2016, the share of workers reporting that they had been sexually har-
assed in the past two years dropped considerably, to 6 percent for men 
and 18 percent for women. 
The trends provide some comfort and some concern. That actual or 
attempted rape or sexual assault reported by 1 percent of both men and 
women in 2016 is clearly concerning, and the rate has not consistently 
diminished over the time period. But it is more comforting that most of 
the harassment is not assault or rape and has diminished over time. 
Note also that in the 1980 survey, 26 percent of women reported that 
 
 37 Id. at *31. 
 38 Id. at *33–34. 
 39 See USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8; U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., ISSUES OF MERIT 1–
5 (2017), https://www.mspb.gov/MSPBSEARCH/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=1442317&version=14 
47804&application=ACROBAT [https://perma.cc/5WAC-4BAF] [hereinafter USMSPB ISSUES OF 
MERIT] (providing highlights “[i]n advance of an upcoming report that provides a full analysis of 
our research findings . . .”). 
 40 USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8, at 7; USMSPB ISSUES OF MERIT, supra note 39, at 2. 
 41 USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8, at 58–62 apps. 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6; see also USMSPB ISSUES OF 
MERIT, supra note 39, at 1–2 (providing highlights in “advance of an upcoming report that provides 
a full analysis of our research findings . . .”). 
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they had been pressured for dates, and that the proportion dropped to 
13 percent by 1994, and dropped further to 3 percent in 2016. There is 
also a large share of women who reported that they had been pressured 
for sexual favors—9 percent in 1980 and 1987 and 7 percent in 1994, 
but that too dropped to 3 percent in 2016. What is not ascertainable 
from the survey is whether these requests for dates or pressure for sex-
ual favors were quid pro quo in nature. 
 
TABLE 1. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT SURVEY 
 
Like almost all surveys that elicit information on sexual harass-
ment, the focus in the USMSPB survey is on sexual behavior and does 
not request respondents to indicate whether they have been subjected 
to other behaviors that are based on gender hostility. Furthermore, and 
typical of such surveys, there is no indication recorded in the USMSPB 
survey of the severity of the harassment. 
 Men Women 
 1980 1987 1994 2016 1980 1987 1994 2016 
Unwelcome sexual 
teasing, jokes, re-
marks, questions 
  10   12   14    3   33 35 37   9 
Unwelcome sexually 
suggestive looks or  
gestures 
   8    9     9    1   28 28 29   9 
Unwelcome invasion 
of personal space 
   3    8     8    3   15 26 24   12 
Pressure for dates    7    4     4    1    26 15 13     3 
Unwelcome communi-
cation of a sexual 
nature 
   3    4     4    1     9 12 10     6 
Stalking NA NA     2    1 NA NA 7     2 
Pressure for sexual fa-
vors 
  2   3     2    1   9 9 7     1 
Actual or attempted 
rape or sexual as-
sault 
0.3 0.3     2    1    1 0.8 4     1 
Any behavior reported 15 14    19    6    42 42 44   18 
Note: Percent experiencing unwanted behaviors in previous 2 years. For statistics for 1980, 
1987, and 1994 see USMSPB REPORT, supra note 8. For statistics for 2016, see USMSPB ISSUES 
OF MERIT, supra note 37. “NA” indicates not available. Table rows report category labels used 
in Fall 2017 report. These differ slightly from the category labels used in the 1995 report as 
follows (numbered in order of rows in table): 
1. 1995 report did not include the word “Unwelcome” 
2. 1995 report used the phrase “Sexual looks, gestures” 
3. 1995 report used the phrase “Deliberate touching, leaning, cornering” 
4. No difference 
5. 1995 report used the phrase “Letters, calls, sexual materials” 
6. No difference 
7. No difference 
8. 1995 report used the phrase “Actual/attempted rape, assault” 
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III. WHAT DOESN’T WORK: CURRENT APPROACHES TO DETERRENCE 
Currently, three mechanisms show potential to deter or prevent 
sexual harassment to varying degrees of success. Training attempts to 
change the preferences of harassers ex ante. In contrast, both legal con-
sequences under Title VII and market incentives act to impose an ex 
post cost on sexual harassers. I next discuss the shortcomings of each 
of these schemes in their ability to alter the behavior of sexual har-
assers. 
A. Policies and Training 
It is routine for large companies to have policies, workplace train-
ing, and reporting procedures to prevent sexual harassment.42 Work-
place training has been shown to raise awareness of what constitutes 
sexual harassment,43 although there is little evidence that such train-
ing is effective in reducing sexual harassment in the workplace. How-
ever, the consensus in the literature is that best practices for organiza-
tions are to have in place strong policies and a reporting procedure.44 
This would also be the guidance of lawyers responsible for protecting 
employers, as these policies and procedures may serve as a legal defense 
against liability.45 Availability of confidential counselors is another pro-
cedural tool utilized to encourage reporting. But studies confirm that 
this too fails to be effective.46 
Furthermore, as the litany of harassers shows, it is quite clear that 
these organizational efforts have been insufficient to prevent workplace 
sexual harassment or costly settlements to victims who were not pro-
tected by the organization’s structure. Before the #MeToo movement 
gained momentum, in 2016, Fox News CEO and chairman Roger Ailes 
was ousted in light of a barrage of evidence of longstanding sexual har-
 
 42 Id. 
 43 See Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, Does Sexual Harassment Training Change 
Attitudes? A View from the Federal Level, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 826, 838–40 (2003). 
 44 See, e.g., Peter Aronson, Justices’ Sex Harassment Decisions Spark Fears: Companies Re-
view Policies to Avoid ‘Ellerth’ Liability, 21 NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 9, 1998), at A1; David Rubenstein, 
Harassment Prevention is Now a Must for U.S. Companies, 93 CORP. LEGAL TIMES 31 (Aug. 1999). 
 45 See Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,  https://www.eeo 
c.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/4H6N-GTP5] (last visited Jan. 16, 201- 
9). 
 46 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 8, at 17 (“The functioning of the confidential counsellor is 
unsatisfactory. Few of the harassed employees contacted a confidential counsellor. From the stud-
ies reviewed it appears that confidential counsellors often lack the necessary facilities to do their 
work, are too close to management, and are relatively unknown or not trusted. It is also difficult 
for confidential counsellors to work in organisations that lack an awareness of the problem.”). 
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assment against many female Fox News employees, despite formal pol-
icies, workplace training, and reporting procedures.47 Ultimately this 
behavior proved costly to the organization: A lawsuit filed by former Fox 
News host Gretchen Carlson resulted in a $20 million settlement.48 
The failure of established procedures to deter harassment is not 
limited to the top of the corporate structure: Despite a successful law-
suit for sexual and racial harassment by blue-collar workers at Ford 
plants in Chicago in the 1990s, and established procedures to deter har-
assment as well as union representation, workers continued to be sex-
ually harassed.49 
B. Legal Ramifications under Title VII 
The EEOC characterizes sexual harassment as “unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical har-
assment of a sexual nature.”50 Employers have a possible defense 
against liability if (1) the employer takes reasonable care to prevent 
harassment (such as disseminating a policy against harassment and 
establishing reporting procedures), (2) the employer promptly corrects 
any sexually harassing behavior, and (3) the employee unreasonably 
fails to take advantage of the employer’s preventive or corrective oppor-
tunities.51 In such cases, the employee is only entitled to relief if she 
takes advantage of the employer’s procedures and remedies, which gen-
erally means that the employee must report sexual harassing behavior 
to their employer.52 
Title VII allows for the award of both compensatory and punitive 
damages. However, the total damage award is capped and determined 
 
 47 John Koblin et al., Roger Ailes Leaves Fox News, and Rupert Murdoch Steps In, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/business/media/roger-ailes-fox-news.html [h 
ttps://perma.cc/U4BQ-2E7V]. 
 48 Sarah Ellison, Fox Settles with Gretchen Carlson for $20 Million–and Offers an Unprece-
dented Apology, VANITY FAIR (Sep. 6, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/fox-news-se 
ttles-with-gretchen-carlson-for-20-million [https://perma.cc/639J-JJVE]. 
 49 See Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change a Culture of Harassment? 
Ask Women at Ford. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/ 
us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/X4FF-TCTG]; Susan C- 
hira & Catrin Einhorn, Ford Apologizes for Sexual Harassment at Chicago Factories, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/us/ford-apology-sexual-harassment.html [http 
s://perma.cc/QK6Y-RBP6]. 
 50 Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 45. 
 51 Id. 
 52 An exception to the requirement to report sexual harassment to the employer would arise 
if the employee is being harassed by a supervisor, and there is no one else to whom to report the 
harassment. See Monteagudo v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 554 
F.3d 164, 171–72 (1st Cir. 2009). In addition, a jury may find that “a failure to file a complaint 
[was not] unreasonable . . . .” Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 
2003). 
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by the number of employees of the defendant firm, with the total award 
capped at a maximum of $300,000 (excluding back pay) if the employer 
has 500 or more employees.53 
These compensatory damages can be fairly low, especially with re-
spect to back pay, which is directly connected to the victim’s pay. The 
Supreme Court decision State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Campbell54 usually limits punitive damages to less than a ten to one 
ratio to compensatory damages.55 Subject to this punitive to compensa-
tory damages ratio constraint, the current limit on the sum of compen-
satory and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases of 
$300,000 for the largest firms implies that any individual with compen-
satory damages of more than $27,273 is eligible for less than the maxi-
mum punitive damages award that would be available without the Title 
VII caps. Raising the current cap on damages awards to my proposed 
$7.6 million would mean that compensatory damages of up to $690,972 
would be eligible for the maximum punitive damages award. 
It should be clear that there are steep barriers to launching a suc-
cessful lawsuit against an employer for sexual harassment. Most em-
ployers have policies prohibiting sexual harassment and typically pro-
vide training of some kind.56 Because claimants usually need to report 
the harassing behavior to their employer before filing a charge with the 
EEOC, they risk retaliation within their current employment.57 Fur-
thermore, even when plaintiffs jump through the hurdles that Title VII 
provides to both bring suit against their harassers and prove that the 
sexual harassment occurs, their ultimate reward is not significant 
enough to deter sexual harassment in the future. 
 
 53 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2012). The maximum total damages award for employers with 15 to 
100 employees is $50,000; for those with 101 to 200 employees, $100,000; for 201 to 500 employees, 
$200,000. These limits have not been raised since 1991. Damages awards may differ by state; for 
example, $500,000 in punitive damages was awarded in Gyulakian v. Lexus of Watertown Inc., 56 
N.E.3d 785, 799 (Mass. 2016). 
 54 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 55 Id. at 425–26; see also Alison F. Del Rossi and W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape of 
Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 120 (2010) (the authors found 
“after the State Farm decision there has been a statistically significant drop in the number of 
blockbuster punitive damages awards, their amount, and the ratio of punitive damages to com-
pensatory damages”); Benjamin J. McMichael and W. Kip Viscusi, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distri-
bution of Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 350, 350 (June 
2014) (the authors found “State Farm shifts the fat tail of the distribution of blockbuster awards 
down (or ‘thins’ the tail), which is consistent with a constraining effect on award size,” and that 
“State Farm also has a negative influence on the probability of exceeding a single-digit ratio be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages”). 
 56 Megan Cole, 71 Percent of Organizations Offer Sexual Harassment Prevention Training, 
ASS’N TALENT DEV. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.td.org/insights/71-percent-of-organizations-offer-
sexual-harassment-prevention-training [https://perma.cc/CL6K-D46V]. 
 57 See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018). 
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C. Corporate Oversight 
There are a staggering number of examples of sexual misconduct 
that appeared to be known by industry insiders but largely concealed 
until publicly revealed by the #MeToo movement.58 But in situations in 
which sexual harassers are considered essential to an organization’s 
success, organizations have often been slow to respond to complaints. 
Below are some prominent examples that highlight the tension between 
protection of victims and corporate priorities. 
The situation facing the Wynn Resorts board of directors is one 
such example of this tension. On Friday, January 26, 2018, the Wall 
Street Journal reported on decades-long practices of sexual harassment 
by Steve Wynn, founder and billionaire owner of landmark Las Vegas 
hotels and casinos.59 Wynn Resorts stock fell 10 percent on that Friday 
and an additional 9 percent the following Monday.60 
As a publicly traded company, the board of directors has a duty to 
shareholders to protect their interests.61 The stock market hit clearly 
reflected shareholder angst over the future of the company. But the 
board debated whether to oust Wynn. Few companies are as closely 
identified with their founder and chief executive as is Wynn Resorts.62 
Although a number of the largest and most successful companies are 
closely identified with their founder—think of Microsoft, Apple, Ama-
zon, and Facebook—few companies actually bear the founder’s name. 
The Wynn brand is integrally entwined with Steve Wynn, his flagship 
 
 58 Perhaps the starkest example is provided by Harvey Weinstein, whose exposure as a serial 
sexual predator is credited with invigorating the #MeToo movement. See Jodi Kantor & Megan 
Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [ht  
tps://perma.cc/JAL6-HU3W]. Weinstein’s reputation within the film industry was so widely known 
that Family Guy creator Seth MacFarlane could joke about Weinstein’s sexual conduct at the 2013 
Oscar ceremony, announcing the five nominees for best actress by saying, “‘Congratulations, you 
five ladies no longer have to pretend to be attracted to Harvey Weinstein,’ which elicited a sus-
tained laugh from the audience.” Maya Oppenheim, Seth MacFarlane Made Joke about Harvey 
Weinstein and Women at 2013 Oscars, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.independent.co. 
uk/arts-entertainment/films/news/seth-macfarlane-harvey-weinstein-joke-oscars-2013-women-se 
xual-harassment-allegations-a7994506.html [https://perma.cc/RDW8-G2QY]. 
 59 Alexandra Berzon et al., Dozens of People Recount Pattern of Sexual Misconduct by Las 
Vegas Mogul Steve Wynn, WALL STREET J., Jan. 27, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-
people-recount-pattern-of-sexual-misconduct-by-las-vegas-mogul-steve-wynn-1516985953 [https:/ 
/perma.cc/BEH3-9C7P]. 
 60 Bill Peters, Could Wynn Resorts Be Sold in Wake of CEO’s Sexual-Misconduct Allegations?, 
INV. BUS. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.investors.com/news/wynn-keeps-diving-as-fall-
out-grows-over-ceo-steve-wynn-sexual-misconduct-allegations/ [https://perma.cc/V738-2TTL]. 
 61 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179–80 (Del. 1986) (cit-
ing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) 
overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 62 Elizabeth Winkler, Wynn Resorts Is the Biggest Test for Investors’ Tolerance, WALL STREET 
J. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wynn-resorts-is-the-biggest-test-for-investors-151 
7248977 [https://perma.cc/H447-R2XB]. 
160 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
properties bear his name, and as founder, chief executive, and largest 
stockholder of Wynn Resorts, he was considered essential to the brand 
identity and success of the firm.63 
Therein lay the board’s dilemma as to whether to oust Wynn from 
his position. Removing Wynn may have salved short run stock price 
concerns, but such removal may have longer run negative consequences 
if Wynn was indeed essential to the firm’s success, which would make 
retaining Wynn the preferred option. Wynn resigned as CEO of Wynn 
Resorts following the media coverage.64 
Not only may corporate boards fail to take action to oust leaders 
when they have information about allegations of sexual misconduct and 
settlement payouts, but information about sexual misconduct and pay-
outs can also be cleverly concealed. Again, Steve Wynn provides a 
model. As public records from Wynn’s prior divorce litigation revealed, 
he created a limited-liability company in 2005 for the sole purpose of 
paying $7.5 million to the manicurist employed by Wynn Resorts who 
had accused Wynn of forcing her to have sex with him.65 
Moreover, prior allegations of sexual harassment do not seem to 
provide sufficient deterrence to future employers. For example, Ross 
Levinsohn, who has now been ousted as CEO and publisher of the Los 
Angeles Times, had been a defendant in two sexual harassment law-
suits while in positions he held prior to the Los Angeles Times.66 And 
harassers often ride out even highly publicized sexual harassment 
charges and apparently suffer little long-term consequences. For exam-
ple, in 2007, a jury awarded $11.6 million to a woman in a sexual har-
assment suit against Isiah Thomas, President of the New York Knicks, 
for behavior that began in 2004.67 During and after the suit, he was not 
fired from his post at the Knicks.68 He served as head coach for the Flor-
ida International University men’s basketball program from 2009–2012 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Everett Rosenfeld, Steve Wynn is Out as CEO of Wynn Resorts, CNBC (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/steve-wynn-is-out-as-ceo-of-wynn-resorts.html [https://perma.cc 
/8KCW-MTDY]. 
 65 Kate O’Keeffe, Steve Wynn Set Up LLC to Pay His Accuser, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/steve-wynn-set-up-llc-to-pay-his-accuser-1517858826 [https://perma 
.cc/PM34-834Q]. 
 66 Lydia O’Connor, L.A. Times Publisher Accused of Sexual Misconduct, ‘Frat House’ Behavior, 
HUFFPOST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ross-levinsohn-la-times-sexual-
misconduct_us_5a60ecc3e4b01767e3d18eac [https://perma.cc/UAZ4-767J]. 
 67 See Jonathan Abrams & Lynn Zinser, Thomas Returns to Knicks as Part-Time Consultant, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/sports/basketball/07knick.html?mt 
rref=www.google.com&gwh=459376E6E8BBC677AD2CBDA7CEC54DA0&gwt=pay [https://perm 
a.cc/3Q5N-EHGT]; Michael S. Schmidt & Maria Newman, Jury Awards $11.6 Million to Former 
Knicks Executive, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/sports/basketbal 
l/03garden-cnd.html [https://perma.cc/D922-EU5Q]. 
 68 See Abrams & Zinser, supra 67. 
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and became president and part-owner of the Knick’s WNBA sister team, 
the New York Liberty.69 
Furthermore, it is not necessarily to a firm’s benefit to take a hard 
line on sexual harassment. One visible example is that of Mark Hurd, 
former CEO of Hewlett-Packard (HP), who was accused of sexual har-
assment by Jodie Fisher, a former contractor to HP. Although HP did 
not find that Hurd had violated the company sexual harassment policy, 
HP board members considered his behavior to demonstrate a lack of 
judgment that undermined his effectiveness, and he was forced to re-
sign. It is notable that the stock market and market for executives dis-
played a more favorable response to Hurd’s leadership of HP: HP’s stock 
price dropped by 8.3 percent on the first day of trading following Hurd’s 
forced resignation, and Hurd was quickly hired by Oracle as co-presi-
dent.70 
And even when an organization successfully ousts an executive for 
sexual misconduct, the organization may be responsible for paying legal 
fees for any ensuing arbitration over the termination. These legal fees 
can be substantial, as indicated in the termination of Leslie Moonves as 
CEO of CBS, with a reported estimate of $50 million in legal costs to be 
paid by CBS to represent CBS, its board, and Moonves.71 
Settlements such as the $20 million awarded to Gretchen Carlson 
would also seemingly provide a market incentive to corporations to de-
ter sexual harassment. However, what is perhaps most notable is that 
the existence of and amount of this settlement was publicly reported 
rather than concealed through a nondisclosure agreement. Any deter-
rence effects of even large settlements is reduced if information about 
the prevalence and size of settlements is concealed. Furthermore, even 
the higher pay workers receive as a compensating differential will be 
insufficient to deter sexual harassment if the true risk is unrecognized 
by workers because of low reporting, high turnover, and confidential 
settlements. 
As these examples indicate, despite market pressures to eliminate 
unprofitable corporate activities, under the current legal regime, there 
 
 69 Ben Golliver, Former Knicks Executive Isiah Thomas Fired by FIU, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 6, 
2012), https://www.cbssports.com/nba/news/former-knicks-executive-isiah-thomas-fired-by-fiu/ [h 
ttps://perma.cc/D36U-ZTNJ?type=image]; Ben Mathis-Lilley, Knicks Hire Executive Who Lost $11 
Million Sexual Harassment Suit to Run WNBA Team, SLATE (May 25, 2015), http://www.slate.com 
/blogs/the_slatest/2015/05/05/certified_sexual_harasser_isiah_ thomas_hired_ to_run_women_s_b 
asketball_team.html [https://perma.cc/A6UK-MY34]. 
 70 See Ben Worthen & Pui-Wing Tam, H-P Chief Quits in Scandal, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 7, 
2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703309704575413663370670900 [https:// 
perma.cc/XXT2-9KCL]. 
 71 James B. Stewart, CBS Is Footing Moonves’s Legal Bills, Giving Him an Incentive to Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/business/cbs-les-moonves-legal-f 
ight.html [https://perma.cc/K765-UPZN?type=image]. 
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are clear limits to the ability of the market to deter sexual harassment. 
Markets cannot work to eliminate illegal and violent sexually predatory 
behavior in the presence of misinformation and deceit and in the ab-
sence of meaningful sanctions or consequences. 
IV. DAMAGE AWARDS AS A DETERRENT TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A. Compensating Differentials for Job Risks 
Title VII provides for compensatory as well as punitive damages 
awards for workplace discrimination. Such damages awards serve the 
dual purposes of compensating victims and providing an incentive to 
firms to not discriminate. Damages caused by discrimination in pay, 
promotion, and hiring are fairly easily monetized, for example, by com-
paring pay between those in a protected class to similar workers not in 
a protected class. Although the exact estimate of damages may differ, 
forensic economists routinely calculate compensatory damages in em-
ployment discrimination cases, and there is considerable agreement 
over accepted methodology.72 
The harm caused by sexual harassment is not so easily monetized. 
In part, a large share of the harm caused by sexual harassment is psy-
chological, which would be difficult to quantify, and victims are unlikely 
to be made whole with money. Another, more subtle problem with quan-
tifying the harm caused by sexual harassment is that an individual vic-
tim’s pay may actually be enhanced, possibly as a means to obtain com-
plicity or silence. Despite inherent measurement problems, sexual 
harassment harm clearly is monetized in the form of financial settle-
ments paid to victims, with the few values that have been publicly re-
ported showing a substantial range.73 
My approach to monetizing the harm caused by sexual harassment 
starts by recognizing that sexual harassment is a job risk. It is by no 
means a risk that is a necessary part of the workplace, but, as survey 
 
 72 See Michael R. Luthy et al., A 2015 Survey of Forensic Economists: Their Methods, Esti-
mates, and Perspectives, 26 J. FORENSIC ECON. 53–83 (2015). 
 73 For example, former Fox News host Gretchen Carlson received a $20 million settlement; 
five sexually harassed Guess employees received a total $500,000 settlement; and two women who 
alleged they were sexually harassed by former presidential candidate Herman Cain when he was 
CEO of the National Restaurant Association received settlements of $45,000 and $35,000 (which 
Cain described as severance payments). See Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Fox Settles 
with Gretchen Carlson over Roger Ailes Sex Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-gretchen-carlson-sexual-har-
assment-lawsuit-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/P7DS-AWAV]; Valeriya Safronova, Paul Mar-
ciano Will Leave Guess after Sexual Harassment Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/style/guess-harassment-resignation.html [https://perma.cc/4WVP-7 
3XT]; Michael D. Shear et al., Cain Accuser Tells of Pattern of Behavior, Lawyer Attests, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/us/politics/cain-accuser-tells-of-harassment-
pattern-lawyer-attests.html [https://perma.cc/G2S9-WRKG]. 
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evidence reviewed in Part II documents, it nonetheless is common. Most 
activities involve tradeoffs, and often the tradeoff is between money or 
time and safety. It is costly for firms to eliminate job risks such as risks 
of fatality and injury—and of sexual harassment. It is also costly to 
firms to not strive to eliminate these risks. Employers need to pay a 
wage premium—referred to as a “compensating differential”—to attract 
workers to risky jobs.74 A massive literature documents that workers in 
jobs at greater risk of fatality are paid a premium for bearing greater 
risk, and indeed, this premium pay forms the basis for calculating the 
value of statistical life.75 Furthermore, in setting regulatory safety 
standards, most federal agencies require comparison of the costs of im-
plementing safety improvements to the value of lives saved from im-
proved safety.76 
It is not mere speculation that firms might pay a premium for ex-
posure to risk of sexual harassment. As coverage of Steve Wynn’s pat-
tern of sexually harassing employees made clear, the high pay at Wynn 
casinos relative to alternative jobs in Las Vegas served to reduce turn-
over and attract employees despite widespread risk of sexual harass-
ment. Ex-employees reported to the Wall Street Journal that they tol-
erated workplace harassment because jobs at Wynn were among the 
highest paying in Las Vegas.77 
Despite a large literature investigating whether workers are paid 
compensating differentials for a variety of working conditions, the eco-
nomics literature had only consistently established compensating dif-
ferentials for workplace risk of fatality or injury.78 My research, de-
scribed below, is the first to consider the possibility of compensating 
differentials for risk of sexual harassment. To briefly summarize my 
methodology and primary result, I created the first measures in the lit-
erature of risk of sexual harassment, estimated wage equations control-
ling for this risk, and identified that workers in industries at greater 
 
 74 The “theory of compensating differentials” originated with Adam Smith and is a standard 
topic in economics textbooks. A review of the literature and discussion of the underlying theory is 
W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1912 (1993). See also Robert 
S. Smith, Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy: A Review, 32 INDUS. AND LAB. 
RELATIONS REV. 339, 339–40 (1979). 
 75 See Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of 
Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2003). 
 76 See id. at 40–42; W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation 
Criteria, 25 RAND J. ECON. 94, 94–95 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluation of Life, 3 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 103, 105 (2009); U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. 
AFFAIRS, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL 
ENTITIES 94 (2003). 
 77 Berzon et al., supra note 59. 
 78 Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment, 101 AM. ECON. REV.: 
PAPERS & PROC. 630, 630 (2011). 
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risk of sexual harassment received a pay premium for exposure to a 
working condition that workers found so heinous.79 It is worth noting 
that my approach, which takes into account the risk of sexual harass-
ment, obviates concerns of reverse causality in which workers who are 
at lower pay are more likely to be targets of harassment.80 
B. Sexual Harassment Risks 
The first step in examining the labor market implications of sexual 
harassment claims requires calculation of sexual harassment risk.81 To 
do so, I used data I obtained from the EEOC through a FOIA request. I 
calculated gender-specific estimates of the risk of sexual harassment by 
industry and age group,82 by dividing the number of individual charges 
that include sexual harassment within each industry and age group by 
the corresponding levels of employment in the same industry and age 
group from the Current Population Survey (CPS).83 In contrast to sur-
vey evidence of sexual harassment prevalence, my methodology pro-
vides a well-defined measure of the risk of sexual harassment that al-
lows comparison across sectors of the economy. 
Table 2 reports sexual harassment claim rates per 100,000 workers 
by gender and major industry as well as the percent female in the in-
dustry based on the construction of sexual harassment risk described 
above. Clearly women are far more likely to file a claim of sexual har-
assment than are men. The pattern across industries indicates that 
women are at a greater risk of sexual harassment in male-dominated 
 
 79 Id. at 633–35. 
 80 If we observe that harassed workers have lower pay, we cannot be sure whether the har-
assment caused the individual worker to have lower pay, or if the worker is harassed specifically 
because they are lower paid and potentially more vulnerable. Because any individual’s experience 
of sexual harassment will have only a small effect on the risk measure for that industry and age 
group, we can largely rule out the possibility that the individual’s pay level influenced the risk 
measure for that industry and age group. 
 81 For more information, see Joni Hersch, Valuing the Risk of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 
57 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 111, 117–19 (2018). See also Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 45. 
 82 Specifically, the numerators in this risk measure are the number of sexual harassment 
charges by 2-digit industry (52 industries), six age groups (15–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 
ages 65 and older), and gender. The denominators are the corresponding levels of industry employ-
ment by age group and gender from the Current Population Survey (excluding self-employed work-
ers who would generally not be able to claim sexual harassment against an employer). This follows 
the methodology to construct fatality rates by industry, age, and gender in W. Kip Viscusi and Joni 
Hersch, The Mortality Cost to Smokers, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 943, 944–48 (2008). See Joni Hersch, 
supra note 811 (providing information on the construction of the risk measures and a table that 
lists the risk values for women by detailed industry and age group). 
 83 The CPS is a monthly survey of households conducted by the Bureau of Census for the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. It provides comprehensive data on the labor force, employment, and 
other demographic and labor force characteristics. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force 
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, https://www.bls.gov/cps/ [https://perma.cc/H3L4-
G8V9] (last visited Jan. 16, 2019). 
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industries, with the pairwise correlation between the female rate and 
percent female equal to –0.68 (p=0.01). The male sexual harassment 
claim rate is not correlated with the female rate nor is the male rate 
correlated with percent female. 
TABLE 2: SEXUAL HARASSMENT RATES BY MAJOR INDUSTRY84 
 
Female Male 
Percent  
Female 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
18.10 0.72 25.21 
Mining 72.02 2.31 9.71 
Construction 20.28 0.48 9.58 
Manufacturing 15.88 1.28 30.86 
Wholesale and retail trade 10.21 1.33 45.46 
Transportation and utilities 17.50 1.22 24.48 
Information 19.35 2.73 43.40 
Financial activities 6.98 1.49 57.58 
Professional and business services 14.35 1.89 43.16 
Educational and health services 3.71 1.66 75.13 
Leisure and hospitality  14.53 2.15 51.55 
Other services  6.64 1.29 52.70 
Public administration 16.67 2.20 45.94 
Labor market overall 8.61 1.35  
Notes: Per 100,000 workers. Rates are calculated by the author from EEOC 
Charge Data FY2000–FY2004 based on claims by individuals in which at 
least one issue was sexual harassment and in which industry is reported. 
Employment data calculated using 2004 Current Population Survey. 
 
For the labor market sample that I analyze, the overall sexual har-
assment rate is 8.61 per 100,000 workers for females, and 1.35 per 
100,000 workers for males. Female employees are consequently 6.4 
times more likely to file a sexual harassment claim. Because of the 
small number of sexual harassment claims brought by men, the ensuing 
analysis focuses on sexual harassment rates based on claims brought 
by women, as these rates are more reliable. The overall rates of sexual 
harassment claims are in the same general range as the frequency of 
workplace fatality rates, of about 4 in 100,000,85 which is about half the 
sexual harassment claim rate for female employees. 
 
 84 This table appears in Hersch, supra note 78, at 632. 
 85 See Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Summary, 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Dec. 18, 
2018, 10:00AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/T7B8-DLMA]. 
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C. Wage Equations 
The next step is to merge the sexual harassment risk measures 
with data that includes wage information and detailed information on 
other characteristics associated with wage in order to isolate the influ-
ence of sexual harassment risk on wage.86 In particular, I take into ac-
count detailed information on education, race, ethnicity, type of em-
ployer, union status, marital status, location, and potential work 
experience. Importantly, I also take into account the percent female in 
detailed industry and occupation; doing so accounts for the higher risk 
of fatality and injury in male-dominated industries and occupation. 
Using these data, I then estimate conventional log wage regres-
sions. These wage equation estimates are reported in my earlier work.87 
The incremental effect on wage of a 1-in-100,000 increase in risk is 0.18 
percent.88 For women, the log wage difference between a job with zero 
sexual harassment risk and a job with the gender-specific mean sexual 
harassment risk is 0.0155, or about 25 cents per hour for women. With 
annual work hours of 2,000, this rate of compensation would be $500 
annually for women. This value represents the average hazard pay pre-
mium for being in a job with average risk of sexual harassment relative 
to a risk-free job.89 Importantly, because this estimated risk premium 
is derived from labor market information on individual workers, this 
pay premium reflects the value that the workers themselves place on 
the risk of sexual harassment at their workplace that is severe enough 
to result in an EEOC claim. 
V. THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL HARASSMENT (VSH) 
To date, the only mechanism employed by organizations in efforts 
to deter workplace sexual harassment is education and reporting and 
mediating systems. When these approaches fail, the remaining recourse 
for victims is to file a charge with the EEOC. Although the EEOC can, 
and does, litigate some claims, this is quite rare, and most claims will 
be filed and litigated privately. 
There is no apparent connection between damages awards at their 
current level and efficient deterrence, and in fact, to my knowledge, no 
 
 86 The standard wage equation specification used in the hedonic wage literature is of the fol-
lowing form: 
lnሺ𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒ሻ ൌ 𝛼 ൅ 𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ൅ 𝑋𝛾 ൅ 𝜀 
where wage is the hourly wage rate; Risk is a measure of job risk (in this case the risk of sexual 
harassment); X is a vector of explanatory variables such as years of education; 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾 are 
parameters to be estimated; and ε is a random error term.  
 87 Hersch, supra note 78; Hersch, supra note 81. 
 88 Hersch, supra note 81, at 124–25. 
 89 Hersch, supra note 78, at 633. 
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one has suggested using damages awards for the purpose of efficient 
deterrence of sexual harassment.90 But thwarting the current ap-
proaches to curb sexual harassment is the lack of any monetary basis 
for setting awards for efficient deterrence. 
My proposal is to use the hazard pay premium described in Section 
IV for sexual harassment risks to establish the efficient deterrence 
value of awards. Specifically, following the same rationale by which the 
value of a statistical life can serve as the appropriate deterrence meas-
ure for fatality risks, I propose using a measure that I term “the value 
of statistical harassment,” (VSH) to set the total damages amount in 
sexual harassment cases in order to provide optimal deterrence. 
This hazard pay premium has an important implication in terms of 
the rate at which workers are compensated for the risk. To provide a 
numerical illustration, suppose that a group of 100,000 workers each 
receive an extra $50 to incur a sexual harassment risk of 1/100,000. 
Then together this group will experience one expected case of sexual 
harassment (i.e., 100,000 workers × 1/100,000 risk) and will receive $5 
million in compensation (i.e., 100,000 workers × $50 per worker). In this 
example, $5 million is the amount of money that workers receive for 
facing risks that lead to one expected case of sexual harassment to the 
group. By analogy to the approach in the economics literature for the 
value of a statistical life, this amount represents the value of statistical 
harassment (VSH).91 
The procedure for calculating the VSH directly from the empirical 
estimates requires information on the effect of the sexual harassment 
risk on the log of wages (0.0018), the average hourly wage rate ($16.33 
for women), the number of hours in a full-time work year (based on the 
assumption of 50 weeks per year at 40 hours per week), and any adjust-
ment for units (in this case the risk is per 100,000 workers). 
If we denote the effect of fatality rates on the log of wages by b, then 
parallel to the calculation of the VSL,92 the VSH is calculated as 
 
𝑉𝑆𝐻 ൌ  𝑏 ൈ  𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ൈ  2000 ൈ  100000. 
Following this procedure yields VSH estimates of $5.88 million in 
2005 dollars. Converted to 2017 dollars, the VSH is equal to $7.6 mil-
 
 90 See, e.g., Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How the Caps on Damages in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Codified Sex Discrimination, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 249 (2014) 
(making it clear that the cap was not intended for deterrence and citing in her footnote 342 some 
articles critiquing the cap because of inadequate deterrence). 
 91 See Elissa Philip Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi, The Fatality and Morbidity Components of the 
Value of Statistical Life, 46 J. HEALTH ECON. 90, 93 (2016) (Equation 10). 
 92 See id. 
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lion. This value reflects the additional amount that is generated by sex-
ual harassment claims filed with the EEOC. It will consequently cap-
ture both the effect of the harassment claim itself but will also embody 
the influence of all harassment incidents in that industry that are cor-
related with the claim. 
VI. USING THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL HARASSMENT FOR EFFICIENT 
DETERRENCE 
To understand how the VSH can be used to set damages for effi-
cient deterrence of sexual harassment, it is useful to review the role of 
the VSL in promoting deterrence of workplace fatalities. As noted 
above, government agencies use the VSL to establish the value of pre-
venting one expected death, which corresponds to the value of deterring 
behavior that leads to one expected death. By providing a measure of 
the extra compensation workers receive for fatality risk, the VSL de-
rived from the labor market establishes both the value of safety to the 
worker and the price of safety for the injurer. Specifically, it represents 
the amount of money a firm should be willing to spend to reduce the 
risk of fatality. This tradeoff between safety and money is common to 
many other market contexts. Consumers choose between cars with 
more or less safety equipment, with prices reflecting the higher costs to 
manufacturers of greater safety equipment as well as how much con-
sumers value the safety improvement. Manufacturers respond to work-
ers’ tradeoffs by producing cars with less safety equipment that sell at 
lower prices and with more safety equipment that sell at higher prices. 
If car manufacturers find no market for their cars at a particular safety-
price combination, they will alter the mix to meet consumer demand. 
Continuing the analogy of the value of a statistical life to the sexual 
harassment situation, the VSH establishes the value of avoiding har-
assment to female workers and the price of reducing harassment to em-
ployers. Setting damages in EEOC claim cases equal to the VSH will 
send the appropriate price signal to firms of the economic value of har-
assment risks to workers; such damages would represent the amount of 
money employers should be willing to spend to reduce the risk of sexual 
harassment at their organization. As noted above, the VSH corresponds 
to the value of all sexual harassment incidents that women experience 
or are aware of at their workplace so that it will have a broad deterrent 
effect and is not limited to the single case in which the claim has been 
brought. My proposal is that for efficient deterrence, the sum of com-
pensatory and punitive damages should equal the VSH. Unfortunately, 
damages are capped at a level that bears no relation to the value of VSH 
so that the statutory cap would need to be removed or at least increased 
to $7.6 million. 
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This proposal also implicitly embodies the key concepts of the eco-
nomic theory of deterrence. It not only recognizes the fact that sexual 
harassment involves irreplaceable nonmonetary harms, but it also em-
bodies the broader incidence of sexual harassment at the workplace. 
The advantage of the VSH approach is that it implicitly incorpo-
rates aspects of the probability of detection in that an entire toxic work 
environment will affect the VSH to the extent that the employees are 
aware of this environment. While the risk measure pertains to the risk 
of EEOC charges, this measure will likely be correlated with cases of 
sexual harassment that do not lead to charges. The VSH measure con-
sequently captures both the value attached to the risk of an EEOC 
charge and will also capture the valuation of other harassment inci-
dents that are known to workers but which do not lead to an EEOC 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Workplace sexual harassment is a widespread problem that has 
proven immune to legislation and workplace policies designed to pre-
vent such behavior. It is costly to victims. And, although it is also costly 
to organizations, I demonstrate in this Article that it is not costly 
enough to deter workplace sexual harassment: The substantial market 
pressures that organizations currently face have proven inadequate as 
a deterrence. My policy proposal is to raise damages awards to a level 
that will properly incentivize organizations to eliminate sexual harass-
ment. To establish the necessary award amount, I draw on labor market 
data documenting the premium workers receive for bearing the risk of 
sexual harassment. Using this pay premium, I calculate the value of 
statistical harassment, which establishes the award level that will cor-
rectly provide incentives to organizations to deter workplace sexual har-
assment. To implement this proposal, the statutory cap on damages 
must be removed so that the penalties can reach a level sufficient to 
deter sexual harassment and to reflect the value of a reduction in har-
assment to the women who are being protected. The recent #MeToo 
movement has raised visibility about the prevalence and severity of sex-
ual harassment and may lead to further deterrence by raising the prob-
ability that sexually harassing behavior will be reported and lead to 
pertinent legal sanctions. 
